China’s Edge in Satellite Navigation Could Shape a Taiwan Conflict

Discussions about a potential conflict over Taiwan often focus on ships, aircraft, and missiles. Yet one of the most decisive advantages may lie in something far less visible: positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT). In this area, China is increasingly better prepared than the United States.

Modern military operations depend heavily on GPS. It enables precision strikes, synchronizes communications, supports logistics, and keeps joint forces operating on the same timeline. Outside the military, GPS also underpins civilian infrastructure such as aviation, shipping, power grids, telecommunications, and emergency services. This widespread dependence creates a critical vulnerability.

GPS signals are intentionally weak so they can be received by small, low-power devices across the globe. That same weakness makes them easy to disrupt. Relatively simple jamming equipment can block GPS reception, while more advanced spoofing systems can feed false location or timing data into receivers without immediately revealing the deception. In a high-end conflict, disabling GPS does not require destroying satellites; it only requires overwhelming or misleading the signal at the user level.

In a Taiwan scenario, this vulnerability could be decisive. U.S. and allied forces might retain superior platforms and weapons, but without reliable PNT they would struggle to coordinate operations, navigate contested airspace and waters, or deliver precision effects. Losing GPS does not stop a military instantly, but it steadily degrades effectiveness at every level.

China has taken a different approach. Rather than relying on a single satellite system, it has built BeiDou into a broader, layered PNT architecture. This includes satellites, terrestrial transmitters, fiber-based timing networks, and integration with other sensors. The result is greater resilience: if one layer is disrupted, others can compensate. Operating closer to home also allows China to reinforce these systems regionally, particularly around Taiwan and nearby maritime areas.

This layered approach means China may be able to maintain usable navigation and timing even in an environment where GPS is heavily jammed or spoofed. That asymmetry could provide a significant operational advantage, especially in the early stages of a conflict.

The solution is not to abandon GPS, but to reduce dependence on it. The United States and its allies need a more resilient PNT strategy built on redundancy and diversity. This includes receivers that can use multiple satellite constellations, stronger anti-spoofing capabilities, terrestrial navigation backups, and wider use of inertial navigation and sensor fusion. Just as important is training forces to operate effectively when satellite navigation is unreliable or unavailable.

The central lesson is clear: PNT is no longer a background utility—it is a contested warfighting domain. Without serious investment in alternatives and resilience, reliance on GPS could become a strategic liability rather than a strength.